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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Joshua Sexton-Gwin appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon his conditional guilty plea to burglary. Sexton-Gwin claims the district court 
erred in denying his motion to dismiss, which motion was based on Sexton-
Gwin's assertion that there was insufficient probable cause to bind him over on 
the burglary charge. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
After Paul Sligar received a call that someone was at the place where Mr. 
Sligar stored some of his equipment, including a truck he used to "haul grain 
seed and pick rocks," he called Mike Sharp, one of his employees, and asked 
him to see what was going on. (P.H. Tr., p.7, Ls.2-23, p.9, Ls.4-12.) When Mr. 
Sharp arrived, he saw "[t]hat the hood of the Ford truck was lifted up, the seat 
and everything was lifted up and a van was parked in front of it."1 (P.H. Tr., p.15, 
Ls.3-7.) He also saw a man, later identified as Sexton-Gwin, under the hood with 
wrenches. (P.H. Tr., p.15, L.25 - p.16, L.19.) Mr. Sharp called 911 and told 
Sexton-Gwin to leave. (P.H. Tr., p.17, Ls.6-13.) When Mr. Sligar later inspected 
the truck, he noticed the air cleaner from the truck had been removed and there 
were "some scratches on the throttle linkage." (P.H. Tr., p.9, L.24 - p.10, L.1.) 
Law enforcement subsequently made contact with Sexton-Gwin, who was found 
1 The truck was described as a "cab-over farm truck," which means "the cab has 
to be physically lifted to get to the engine compartment." (P.H. Tr., p.19, Ls.17-
18.) The latches to lift the cab are located on the outside of the truck. (P.H. Tr., 
p.12, L.20-p.13, L.9.) 
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hiding in some rocks at a park, and he was arrested. (P.H. Tr., p.25, L.17 - p.28, 
L.7.) 
The state charged Sexton-Gwin with burglary, and the magistrate court 
found probable cause to bind Sexton-Gwin over on the charged offense. (R., 
pp.11-12, 44-45.) Sexton-Gwin filed a "Motion to Dismiss Information and 
Challenged Bind Over Pursuant To I.C. 19-815A," arguing "the state failed to 
allege sufficient facts to establish probable cause at the preliminary hearing." 
(R., p.72.) More specifically, Sexton-Gwin asserted: "The facts alleged by the 
state, even if true, do constitute an entry into a vehicle as defined by I.C. 18-
1401.,,2 (R., p.74.) The district court denied the motion, after which Sexton-Gwin 
entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal the denial. (R., 
pp.79, 84-96; Tr., pp.17-26.) 
2 Sexton-Gwin made a similar argument at the conclusion of the preliminary 
hearing, which the magistrate rejected. (P.H. Tr., p.35, L.8 - p.36, L.19.) 
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ISSUE 
Sexton-Gwin states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Sexton-Gwin's Motion to 
Dismiss because unlatching and lifting the cab-over truck to access 
the engine does not constitute entry of a vehicle; therefore, there 
was no probable cause to believe Mr. Sexton-Gwin committed the 
crime of burglary? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Sexton-Gwin failed to establish he was entitled to dismissal of the 
Information charging him with burglary given that Sexton-Gwin's act of accessing 
the engine compartment of the truck was, under the plain language of the 
burglary statute, an unlawful entry into the truck? 
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ARGUMENT 
Sexton-Gwin Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Motion To 
Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
Sexton-Gwin concedes "there was probable cause to believe that [he] was 
the individual who unlatched and lifted the cab portion of the cab-over truck to 
access the engine compartment," but nevertheless argues, as he did below, that 
"Idaho Code § 18-1401 bars entry into only those areas of a vehicle normally 
used for transporting people or transporting or storing property." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.?) Sexton-Gwin's argument is contrary to the plain language of the 
burglary statute. The district court correctly concluded Sexton-Gwin's act of 
accessing the truck's engine compartment is prohibited by the burglary statute. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law subject 
to de novo review. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 946, 265 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Ct. 
App. 2011). 
C. Sexton-Gwin's Act Of Accessing The Engine Compartment Of The Cab-
Over Truck Constituted Entry Of The Vehicle For Purposes Of The 
Burglary Statute 
Idaho Code § 18-1401 provides, in relevant part: "Every person who 
enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, 
barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel, vehicle, trailer, airplane or 
railroad car, with intent to commit any theft or any felony, is guilty of burglary." 
Sexton-Gwin argues that because the structures identified in the burglary statute 
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"generally serve as shelter for people (as well as storage for their property)," the 
burglary statute only applies to those parts of a "vessel, vehicle, trailer, airplane, 
or railroad car," that serve the same purpose. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-10.) This 
argument fails under the plain language of the statute. 
"Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court 
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory 
construction." Jones, 151 Idaho at 946, 265 P.3d at 1158 (citations omitted). 
"The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning." lfL Resort to legislative history and rules of statutory interpretation is 
unnecessary where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. lfL 
Nothing in the plain language of the burglary statute supports Sexton-
Gwin's argument that entry of a vehicle, for purposes of the burglary statute, is 
limited to the passenger compartment or the trunk. Lifting the hood of a vehicle 
to gain access to the engine compartment constitutes entry of the vehicle just as 
opening the door or trunk would. 3 Sexton-Gwin's attempt to distinguish the 
engine compartment from the rest of the car is illogical on its face because even 
if this Court were to accept his interpretation of the statute as being limited to 
places capable of housing people or storing property, he has failed to explain 
why the contents of the engine compartment are not the property of the vehicle's 
owner. 
Sexton-Gwin's claim that the rule of lenity applies to his case also fails. 
"The rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes should be read 
3 When asked by the district court whether entering the trunk of a car would 
constitute burglary, Sexton-Gwin conceded it would. (Tr., p.?, Ls.15-19.) 
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narrowly and be construed in favor of the defendant." Jones, 151 Idaho at 947, 
265 P.3d at 1159 (citations omitted). "[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after 
considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a grievous 
ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply guess as 
to what [the legislature] intended." Barber v. Thomas, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 2508-09 
(2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The "rule does not require a 
court to disregard the purpose of a statute when it is clear from the context," 
Jones, 151 Idaho at 947, 265 P.3d at 1159, and the mere "grammatical 
possibility of a defendant's interpretation does not command a resort to the rule 
of lenity if the interpretation proffered by the defendant reflects an implausible 
reading of the [legislative] purpose." Abbott v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 18,31 n.9 (2010) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
Because the burglary statute is not ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not 
apply to this case. 4 The district correctly concluded the burglary statute applied 
to Sexton-Gwin's conduct; Sexton-Gwin has failed to show error in the denial of 
his motion to dismiss. 
4 In light of the unambiguous nature of the statute, the Court need not accept 
Sexton-Gwin's invitation to "go beyond the plain language of I.C. § 18-1401 itself 
to determine what conduct the legislature intended to prohibit." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.10.) Even if this Court were to do so, Sexton-Gwin's argument that 
because the legislature defined the term vehicle in Title 49 "by the function it 
serves, not the means by which it serves that function," in no way informs the 
legislative intent in relation to whether entry into an engine compartment of a 
vehicle constitutes burglary. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1 0-11.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Sexton-Gwin's conditional guilty plea to burglary. 
DATED this 28th day of August, 2012. 
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